In re-reading Foucault's Panopticism, I was reminded of the dystopian society depicted in Orwell's 1984. In 1984, totalitarianism has all but eliminated people's individuality and privacy. They are constantly being watched by Big Brother. Even their thoughts are controlled. In Foucault's prison, Big Brother is replaced by an invisible presence: prisoners are constantly watched by an unseen judge, a punishing and omnipresent God, who knows one's every move. Foucault describes how "the vast mechanism [of incarceration] established a slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation that made it possible to pass naturally from disorder to offence and back from a transgression of the law to a slight departure from a rule, an average, a demand, a norm" (p. 307). Is prison a place created to protect society from violent criminals or is its real purpose to silence anyone who deviates from a norm, a rule, established and enforced by the power elite?
Another totalitarian image that comes to mind from our semester readings/viewings is the swaying, automaton-like workers in Metropolis, stripped of individuality, watched constantly. They inhabit a hellish world created solely for the profit of the elite who reside high up above their world.
All of the above authors--from Orwell to Foucault--were writing before the advent of the Internet. While the Internet opens up new lines of communication, it also is subject to hacking, cybercrime, and identity theft. At a seminar about promoting the arts on the internet, a prominent PR person boasted that soon his company would be able to track every website visited and purchase made by consumers. For a monthly fee, even a modest-sized company could find out the habits and preferences of potential consumers. If small nonprofit organizations have access to this kind of information, imagine what corporate giants can do! Do we know what information is being gathered, stored and disseminated to government agencies and employers about us? And how do we address this invasion of our privacy, other than by avoiding the Internet?
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Mythologies April 9, 2008
Mythologies
In Myth Today, Barthes describes myth as a type of speech chosen by history; it is a system of communication that cannot possibly evolve from the nature of things (p. 109). The elements of its form are related to place and proximity (p. 122). Myth belongs to the province of semiology; it is defined not by the object of its message but by the way in which it utters this message (p. 111). Semiology postulates a relation between two items—a signifier (image) and a signified (concept). The third item, the sign, is the associative total of the other two items.
Barthes compares the trilogy of semiology to that of Freud’s theory of dreams: a dream, to Freud, is the functional union of manifest meaning (signifier) and latent meaning (signified). In Freud’s New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), he states:
What has been called the dream we shall describe as the text of the dream or the manifest dream, and what we are looking for, what we suspect, so to say, of lying behind the dream, we shall describe as the latent dream thoughts. Having done this, we can express our two tasks as follows: We have to transform the manifest dream into the latent one, and to explain how, in the dreamer’s mind, the latter has become the former [p. 8-9].
We ask the dreamer to free himself from the impression of the manifest dreams, to divert his attention from the dream as a whole on to the separate portions of its content and to report to us …what associations present themselves to him if he focuses on each of them separately [pp. 9-10].
Freud goes on to state that associations are not the same as latent meaning. To discover the latent meaning, one has to uncover the fixed meaning of symbols within the dream. Likewise, Barthes speaks about the meanings we attach to certain symbols. For example, the image of a Black soldier saluting the French flag on the cover of Paris Match symbolizes the greatness of France as an empire where all men serve faithfully regardless of their race (p. 116).
According to Freud, in a dream, as in the formation of a neurotic symptom, there is a compromise between the unconscious wish and the prohibition of the unacceptable wish. The dream work creates a situation where the unacceptable wish gets expressed but in a disguised form. Behind every manifest content there is a latent content. Thus, the manifest content is always in the service of a defense against the underlying wish or affect. For example, a man develops paralysis of his arm without any physical evidence for it. Investigation reveals that the man intended to hurt someone. The paralysis is the compromise formation. The paralyzed arm shows the wish and the restraint.
Barthes notes that in mythology, unlike in psychoanalysis, signifier and signified are both manifest; one is not hidden behind the other. Myth hides nothing; there is no need of an unconscious to explain myth (p. 122). Barthes states that the function of myth is to distort: “Just as for Freud the manifest meaning of behavior is distorted by its latent meaning, in myth the meaning is distorted by the concept” (p. 122).
The myth is a double system—“a language-object and a metalanguage, a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness” [p. 123]. In myths there are two semiological systems, one embedded in the other. The system of language, or myth as a language-object, results in a sign, which serves as the signifier for the system of myth. (See p. 115.) The signifier can be looked at two ways, as (1) the final term of the linguistic (language) system, and (2) the first term of the mythical system. On the plane of language, Barthes calls the signifier “meaning”; on the plane of myth, he calls it “form.” Signifed means “concept” in both systems. In the mythological system, the “sign” or “signification” has two functions: to point out and notify us, and to make us understand something by imposing it on us.
Barthes states that, in myth, meaning and form coexist but will never be at the same place. He compares this situation to looking out a car window at the passing landscape. The viewer can focus either on the window or on the passing scenery, never on both at the same time. “At one moment I grasp the presence of the glass and the distance of the landscape; at another, on the contrary, the transparence of the glass and the depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is constant: the glass is at once empty and present to me, and the landscape unreal and full” (pp. 123-124). It is this constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which define myth (p. 118).
Friday, May 2, 2008
Habermas and Papacharissi
Habermas described what he saw as the "refeudalization" of the public sphere. He noted that there was an "interweaving of the public and private realm [in which] political authorities assume certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor, [and] social powers now assume political functions...Large organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, excluding the public sphere whenever possible" (p. 354). This comment is reminiscent of Mills' views on our democratic system as "weakened," with power wielded by "the military capitalism of private corporations." Mills noted that "Not only their money, but their friends, their interests, their training...are deeply involved with ...this corporate world" (p. 276).
Habermas wrote his book in 1974, before the advent of the internet. Papacharissi, writing 28 years later in the digital age, noted that "the power of our political system is negated by the influence of special interests, and generally by a growing dependency on a capitalist mentality" (p. 387). In her view, corporations have co-opted the internet as another source of profit making: "For a vast majority of corporations the internet is viewed as another mass entertainment; its widespread and cheap access being a small, but not insurmountable obstacle to profit making." Further, "Advertising revenue has more impact on programming than democratic ideals" (p. 386).
Papacharissi also questions whether we ever had the kind of idealized democratic society Dewey envisioned: "It is ironic that this pinnacle of democracy was rather undemocratic in its structure throughout the centuries, by not including women or people from lower social classes, a point acknowledged by Habermas himself" (p. 380). On a more positive note, she points out that the internet reflects the multiple public spheres that exist in contemporary America, reflecting our collective identities and interests. While not every household in our country has internet use, schools and libraries make the internet universally accessible to those with at least some education (children are introduced to the internet in elementary school). On a global scale, however, with only an estimated 6% of the world's population having internet access, the internet remains the purview of the privileged elite.
Papacharissi questions the quality of the information being transmitted on the internet: "Access to more information does not necessarily create more informed citizens, or lead to greater political activity" (p. 384). In fact, she shares Lanier's views that "Often, online communication is about venting emotion and expressing what Abramson et al. (1988) refer to as 'hasty opinions', rather than rational and focused discourse" (p. 385).
Despite the caveats mentioned above, Papacharissi believes that the internet "does possess the potential to change how we conceive ourselves, the political system, and the world surrounding us" (p. 388). She is hopeful that "groups of netizens brought together by common interests will debate and perhaps strive for the attainment of cultural goals." She concludes that the internet 's virtual sphere is currently "is a vision, not yet a reality" for effecting political and social change.
Habermas wrote his book in 1974, before the advent of the internet. Papacharissi, writing 28 years later in the digital age, noted that "the power of our political system is negated by the influence of special interests, and generally by a growing dependency on a capitalist mentality" (p. 387). In her view, corporations have co-opted the internet as another source of profit making: "For a vast majority of corporations the internet is viewed as another mass entertainment; its widespread and cheap access being a small, but not insurmountable obstacle to profit making." Further, "Advertising revenue has more impact on programming than democratic ideals" (p. 386).
Papacharissi also questions whether we ever had the kind of idealized democratic society Dewey envisioned: "It is ironic that this pinnacle of democracy was rather undemocratic in its structure throughout the centuries, by not including women or people from lower social classes, a point acknowledged by Habermas himself" (p. 380). On a more positive note, she points out that the internet reflects the multiple public spheres that exist in contemporary America, reflecting our collective identities and interests. While not every household in our country has internet use, schools and libraries make the internet universally accessible to those with at least some education (children are introduced to the internet in elementary school). On a global scale, however, with only an estimated 6% of the world's population having internet access, the internet remains the purview of the privileged elite.
Papacharissi questions the quality of the information being transmitted on the internet: "Access to more information does not necessarily create more informed citizens, or lead to greater political activity" (p. 384). In fact, she shares Lanier's views that "Often, online communication is about venting emotion and expressing what Abramson et al. (1988) refer to as 'hasty opinions', rather than rational and focused discourse" (p. 385).
Despite the caveats mentioned above, Papacharissi believes that the internet "does possess the potential to change how we conceive ourselves, the political system, and the world surrounding us" (p. 388). She is hopeful that "groups of netizens brought together by common interests will debate and perhaps strive for the attainment of cultural goals." She concludes that the internet 's virtual sphere is currently "is a vision, not yet a reality" for effecting political and social change.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Mid-Semester Thoughts
Distopia?
I was struck by the grim view many of our authors had for both the future of democracy in the United States, and the future of the world. Harvey writes of an America where democracy is "chronically unstable, difficult if not impossible to command except through the corruption of financial power" (p. 15). Castells postulates the emergence of a Fourth World of exclusion "predominantly populated by women and children" (p. 139). Appadurai quotes Mbembe's world view of "a terrifying landscape, in which order (regularity, predictability, routine, and everydayness itself) is organized around the fact or prospect of violence" (p. 31). Even Dewey, a firm believer in democracy, described his era as one that promoted "social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity," with "regimented" opinion and behavior. This sense of regimentation was vividly depicted in Metropolis, which premiered at the same time Dewey was writing.
Mills believes that the power elite are out for themselves and their corporate entities, with little regard for the public good. He describes a "co-optation by cliques of insiders," who view the government as "an umbrella under whose authority they do their work" (p. 267). Further, he states that the "very rich have used existing laws, they have circumvented and violated existing laws, and they have had laws created and enforced for their direct benefit" (p. 99).
Dyson et al. believe that each change in technology brings about a new wave, a changed economy. Technological advances bring new, unprecedented moral and ecological consequences. In the Second Wave, industrialization, along with a steady influx of immigrant labor, resulted in exploitive labor practices, as well as pollution problems that needed to addressed with labor laws and environmental regulations (we still are working on that one). In the Third Wave, the Knowledge Age, as we explore the "electronic frontier" (Dyson et al., p. 31), humankind confronts the dilemma of "how to organize itself for the common good"(pp. 31-32). Thus, Dyson et al. believe that there is still some interest in "the common good."
It was also heartening to see some optimism about addressing the problem of poverty in The Bottom Billion (p. 12): "The problem of the bottom billion is serious, but it is fixable. It is much less daunting than the problems that were overcome in the twentieth century: disease, fascism, and communism."
I suggest that we turn to Albert Einstein for inspiration.
Einstein and Imagined Communities
"Communities tend to be guided less than individuals by conscience and a sense of responsibility. How much misery does this fact cause mankind! It is the source of wars and every kind of oppression, which fill the earth with pain, sighs and bitterness." (Albert Einstein, 1934)
In reviewing our readings from the first half of the semester--and my responses to them--I began to think of Einstein. Why Einstein? He was a radical thinker, who reconceptualized our view of the world, questioning long-held dogma with a fresh perspective. Who would have thought that time and space could bend, that mass could be converted into energy? In Howard Gardner's book, "Creating Minds," he describes how Einstein retained the vivid imagination of a child throughout his life. In fact, Einstein used visualization, rather than scientific reasoning, to achieve his breakthrough. Einstein believed that "Imagination is everything. It is the preview of life's coming attractions." Further, "Knowledge is limited. Imagination envelops the world."
Last semester, we read about Andersen's "imagined communities." This semester, we heard Calhoun state that globalization exists only because it is imagined. Lanier wrote of the collective consciousness, or hive mind. I posit that we need to make a bold leap of the imagination to stop the "perpetually expansionary" capitalist imperialism Harvey describes, to break out of the "stalemate" Mills describes, to alter the "hive mind." What if we imagined a responsible and humane society where there is no bottom billion, but rather, enough for all, with a redistribution of power and capital? Who will be the next visionary to push the collective consciousness toward imagining this new world view?
Time
A theme reiterated by several authors is our changing notion of time due to changing technology. Benjamin believed that our reactions and perceptions of art are influenced by the medium through which they are received. He noted that, in earlier eras the available technology did not allow for "simultaneous collective experience."
Mills eloquently described the extreme compression of time due to technological advances: "During most of human history, historical change has not been visible to the people who were involved in it.... But now the tempo of change is so rapid, and the means of observation so accessible, that the interplay of event and decision seem often to be quite historically visible" (p. 21).
Castells talked about the transformation of time from sequential to "timeless time." Was Rod Serling (creator of Twilight Zone) right--can we suspend or abolish our sense of sequential time? Can we travel into the past and future through digital technology? Or is it all a matter of perspective? When one is meditating, time stops--there is no past or future, only the present moment, a timeless sense of floating in an altered state of mind. However, outside of the meditative state, we have to acknowledge that we are ruled by our biological clock--we are born, we age, we die. That urgency of limited time informs every decision we humans make--it is quintessentially the human condition. So I'd have to conclude that we humans are driven by our own internal clock, and no digital technology can eliminate that. But the new technology can significantly alter our sense of time, allowing us to communicate globally instantaneously.
I was struck by the grim view many of our authors had for both the future of democracy in the United States, and the future of the world. Harvey writes of an America where democracy is "chronically unstable, difficult if not impossible to command except through the corruption of financial power" (p. 15). Castells postulates the emergence of a Fourth World of exclusion "predominantly populated by women and children" (p. 139). Appadurai quotes Mbembe's world view of "a terrifying landscape, in which order (regularity, predictability, routine, and everydayness itself) is organized around the fact or prospect of violence" (p. 31). Even Dewey, a firm believer in democracy, described his era as one that promoted "social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity," with "regimented" opinion and behavior. This sense of regimentation was vividly depicted in Metropolis, which premiered at the same time Dewey was writing.
Mills believes that the power elite are out for themselves and their corporate entities, with little regard for the public good. He describes a "co-optation by cliques of insiders," who view the government as "an umbrella under whose authority they do their work" (p. 267). Further, he states that the "very rich have used existing laws, they have circumvented and violated existing laws, and they have had laws created and enforced for their direct benefit" (p. 99).
Dyson et al. believe that each change in technology brings about a new wave, a changed economy. Technological advances bring new, unprecedented moral and ecological consequences. In the Second Wave, industrialization, along with a steady influx of immigrant labor, resulted in exploitive labor practices, as well as pollution problems that needed to addressed with labor laws and environmental regulations (we still are working on that one). In the Third Wave, the Knowledge Age, as we explore the "electronic frontier" (Dyson et al., p. 31), humankind confronts the dilemma of "how to organize itself for the common good"(pp. 31-32). Thus, Dyson et al. believe that there is still some interest in "the common good."
It was also heartening to see some optimism about addressing the problem of poverty in The Bottom Billion (p. 12): "The problem of the bottom billion is serious, but it is fixable. It is much less daunting than the problems that were overcome in the twentieth century: disease, fascism, and communism."
I suggest that we turn to Albert Einstein for inspiration.
Einstein and Imagined Communities
"Communities tend to be guided less than individuals by conscience and a sense of responsibility. How much misery does this fact cause mankind! It is the source of wars and every kind of oppression, which fill the earth with pain, sighs and bitterness." (Albert Einstein, 1934)
In reviewing our readings from the first half of the semester--and my responses to them--I began to think of Einstein. Why Einstein? He was a radical thinker, who reconceptualized our view of the world, questioning long-held dogma with a fresh perspective. Who would have thought that time and space could bend, that mass could be converted into energy? In Howard Gardner's book, "Creating Minds," he describes how Einstein retained the vivid imagination of a child throughout his life. In fact, Einstein used visualization, rather than scientific reasoning, to achieve his breakthrough. Einstein believed that "Imagination is everything. It is the preview of life's coming attractions." Further, "Knowledge is limited. Imagination envelops the world."
Last semester, we read about Andersen's "imagined communities." This semester, we heard Calhoun state that globalization exists only because it is imagined. Lanier wrote of the collective consciousness, or hive mind. I posit that we need to make a bold leap of the imagination to stop the "perpetually expansionary" capitalist imperialism Harvey describes, to break out of the "stalemate" Mills describes, to alter the "hive mind." What if we imagined a responsible and humane society where there is no bottom billion, but rather, enough for all, with a redistribution of power and capital? Who will be the next visionary to push the collective consciousness toward imagining this new world view?
Time
A theme reiterated by several authors is our changing notion of time due to changing technology. Benjamin believed that our reactions and perceptions of art are influenced by the medium through which they are received. He noted that, in earlier eras the available technology did not allow for "simultaneous collective experience."
Mills eloquently described the extreme compression of time due to technological advances: "During most of human history, historical change has not been visible to the people who were involved in it.... But now the tempo of change is so rapid, and the means of observation so accessible, that the interplay of event and decision seem often to be quite historically visible" (p. 21).
Castells talked about the transformation of time from sequential to "timeless time." Was Rod Serling (creator of Twilight Zone) right--can we suspend or abolish our sense of sequential time? Can we travel into the past and future through digital technology? Or is it all a matter of perspective? When one is meditating, time stops--there is no past or future, only the present moment, a timeless sense of floating in an altered state of mind. However, outside of the meditative state, we have to acknowledge that we are ruled by our biological clock--we are born, we age, we die. That urgency of limited time informs every decision we humans make--it is quintessentially the human condition. So I'd have to conclude that we humans are driven by our own internal clock, and no digital technology can eliminate that. But the new technology can significantly alter our sense of time, allowing us to communicate globally instantaneously.
Mills: The Power Elite
In The Power Elite, Miller described "the development of a permanent war establishment by a privately incorporated economy inside a political vacuum" (p.19). He sees the democratic system as "weakened," with power wielded by "the military capitalism of private corporations" (p. 276). As far as the motives of the power elite, they are in line with their own corporations, not with the public interest. Miller notes that "Not only their money, but their friends, their interests, their training...are deeply involved with ...this corporate world. To ask a man to suddenly divest himself of these interests and sensibilities is almost like asking a man to become a woman." Miller's comments seem quite modern, as apt today as they were in 1956. He notes that the very rich have created and used laws for their own direct benefit (p. 99). Along with the consolidation of power and wealth at the top among the power elite comes the disenfranchisement of those at the bottom, a theme we have seem repeatedly in our readings this semester. With the interlocking of military and corporate interests, we have produced a Dick Cheney, who entered the Iraqi war for the benefit of a his elite friends and family, meanwhile destroying thousands of people, creating havoc in the Middle East, and creating a huge deficit for the American people. It would seem the checks and balances of the democratic system have been badly derailed.
It is an insidious problem, as governments, the military, and corporations use families and churches and schools as a means to their own end (p.6). I have observed this process firsthand in the Rockland County legislature where I spoke several times on behalf of arts funding. Groups of rightwing born-again Christians were bussed in to fight against funding for Planned Parenthood. The former were given carte blanche to speak at length while those opposing them and those speaking out for nonprofit causes were cut off in mid-sentence after 3 minutes. The question is, how do those caught in the "stalemate" in the middle or the "vicious circle of poverty at the bottom" rectify the problem?
It is an insidious problem, as governments, the military, and corporations use families and churches and schools as a means to their own end (p.6). I have observed this process firsthand in the Rockland County legislature where I spoke several times on behalf of arts funding. Groups of rightwing born-again Christians were bussed in to fight against funding for Planned Parenthood. The former were given carte blanche to speak at length while those opposing them and those speaking out for nonprofit causes were cut off in mid-sentence after 3 minutes. The question is, how do those caught in the "stalemate" in the middle or the "vicious circle of poverty at the bottom" rectify the problem?
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Benjamin and Collectivism
I was struck by Benjamin's comment that "the greater the decrease in the social significance of an art form, the sharper the distinction between criticism and enjoyment by the public. The conventional is uncritically enjoyed and the truly new is criticized with aversion." He notes that an individual person's reactions "are predetermined by the mass audience response." Anotherwards, people follow the crowd. Few want to take the risk of sticking their necks out with an opinion that has not already been confirmed by the mass audience. Benjamin was referring to movies, but his comment is applicable to the digital technology of our era. In "Digital Maoism," Lanier wrote "Every individual who is afraid to say the wrong thing within his or her organization is safer when hiding behind a wiki or some other Meta aggregation ritual." Lanier termed this collectivism "a hive mind." Benjamin believed that our reactions and perceptions of art are influenced by the medium through which they are received. He noted that in earlier eras the available technology did not allow for "simultaneous collective experience." He gives the example of viewing a painting versus viewing a movie. While a painting might be exhibited in a hall, it could not be viewed on simultaneous screens across the country, or even the world. The simultaneous transmission is a function of the medium, or technology. Benjamin's observation is apt for our fast-paced digital era, when much of our artwork is created and transmitted on line.
The question that deserves further investigation is this: Does our new technology--and its "simultaneous collective experience"-- stifle the original creative impulse, still the voice of the pioneer? In writing about the mindset of collectivism, Lanier lamented a "loss of insight and subtlety, a disregard for the nuances of considered opinions, and an increased tendency to enshrine the official or normative beliefs of an organization." Perhaps 50 years from now we will have the hindsight to assess the digital revolution's impact more objectively.
The question that deserves further investigation is this: Does our new technology--and its "simultaneous collective experience"-- stifle the original creative impulse, still the voice of the pioneer? In writing about the mindset of collectivism, Lanier lamented a "loss of insight and subtlety, a disregard for the nuances of considered opinions, and an increased tendency to enshrine the official or normative beliefs of an organization." Perhaps 50 years from now we will have the hindsight to assess the digital revolution's impact more objectively.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Dewey and the Roaring 20s
Dewey (p. 115) lamented that "The creation of political unity has also promoted social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity. Opinion has been regimented as well as outward behavior. The temper and flavor of the pioneer have evaporated with extraordinary rapidity." He noted that half of the population don't bother to vote, and that people are much more interested in "easy and cheap"amusements than they are in serious dialog about the future of democracy.
Looking back at the 1920s from our current perspective, it was a revolutionary time in which old conventions and behaviors were overturned, women voted, and cut their skirts and hair short, and African American music (The Jazz Age) and dance (the Charleston, Suzie Q) entered mainstream culture for the first time. (In 1923 the first all-Black Broadway musical made the Charleston a worldwide sensation). All this rapid change brought about Prohibition and a conservative backlash. Thus, I disagree with Dewey's assessment of his era as uniform and mediocre. Culturally, the 1920s was a highly creative time when the public was reinventing itself, with women and African Americans making their mark in a new amd more public way. People enjoyed new technologies such as the automobile, radio, and movies, and used technology for the rapid transmission of culture around the world.
Looking back at the 1920s from our current perspective, it was a revolutionary time in which old conventions and behaviors were overturned, women voted, and cut their skirts and hair short, and African American music (The Jazz Age) and dance (the Charleston, Suzie Q) entered mainstream culture for the first time. (In 1923 the first all-Black Broadway musical made the Charleston a worldwide sensation). All this rapid change brought about Prohibition and a conservative backlash. Thus, I disagree with Dewey's assessment of his era as uniform and mediocre. Culturally, the 1920s was a highly creative time when the public was reinventing itself, with women and African Americans making their mark in a new amd more public way. People enjoyed new technologies such as the automobile, radio, and movies, and used technology for the rapid transmission of culture around the world.
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